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In this paper we intend to present the new power which is given to Russia upon EU due to her 
great natural resources and due to her control upon pipelines. Now Moscow can exert influence 
upon countries in Europe not through its revolutionary zeal and its tanks and army, but through 
its resources. And she knows how to use them and how make the EU dependent on her will: this 
is a new geopolitics, a 21-th century geopolitics, which is centered upon the control of gas 
pipelines in Central Asian states and upon EU states’ great dependence on Russian pipeline 
system. 
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Very few people could say that in their life time they could see a collapsing empire without war. 
Of  course, in the  second part  of  20-th  century  there  was  a  war,  a  Cold War,  which  had  as 
centerpieces Washington and Moscow; but during the last years of ’80s, there could be observed 
a constant decline in Eastern bloc, precipitated by Cernobyl accident in 1986. The Gorbachev’s 
Glasnost and Perestroika policies
2 had played a big role in the disintegration of the Eastern bloc, 
the fall of Berlin Wall, and which ended with USSR collapse in December 1991. The most 
important  heir  of  USSR  was  Russia;  but  during  ’90s,  it  had  hardly  overcome  its  domestic 
problems and crises, the biggest one taking place in 1997. So there disappeared a contender from 
the “game” without any military contest between him and the other one. 
But as it is a well known fact that states never forget, the imperial memories of Moscow couldn’t 
have been erased from collective memory of Russians, and especially, from political leaders 
incumbent in Moscow. During this period Moscow has shed its empire’s loosing, but the biggest 
problem lays in the fact that Moscow hasn’t yet found a new role for it in the world.
3 In terms of 
foreign policy, Russia’s leaders have failed to forget the legacy of the lost Soviet empire.
4 Even 
the Moscow’s behavior provides kinships: he who looks at war in Georgia in August 2008 could 
see resemblances with what happened in Budapest in 1956, or in Prague in 1968, but which had 
the peculiarity of instigations of ethnic minorities from different republics against the Georgian 
state’s structure.
5 
But what was a constant peculiarity of Russian politics after 1997 crises was the recurrence of 
Moscow’s direct interference in Russia’s energy policy, especially regarding control over gas 
pipelines. And the democracy – even that week democracy – in Russia slipped into recession; this 
is  partly  due  to  disillusioned  and  disenfranchised  voters,  which  choose  to  embrace  an 
authoritarian strongman.
6 Of course, this is a special peculiarity of Russian society: “the central 
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and significant reality of Russian politics has been its predominantly autocratic character.”
7 As 
such, there has been perceived in Russia a deep-seated insecurity and – its antidote – willing 
acceptance of an all-controlling leader, and respect for power and certainty of goals.
8 
This is a short presentation of Russian policy, and its continuity. But during different historical 
periods, Moscow used different instruments to spread its influence and to generate fear. Today, 
there is no more fear of a nuclear attack from Moscow over Europe or USA, but during the cold 
days of winter Europeans can feel the strong arm of Moscow; repeatedly it has appealed to the 
energy weapon to make its strong arm felt in countries from European continent. 
This is a noteworthy aspect, because already in 1919 at Peace Conference in Versailles, President 
Wilson asserted that there could be identified “three crucial elements in international relations – 
international transport, international communications, and oil”, and the influence which a country 
would have in international affairs would be direct influenced by the position which that country 
had in these three key areas.
9 As the time passed, there appeared another key-element: the natural 
gas. In is a source of energy and heating, and what is important, it is much friendlier with the 
environment in comparison with oil and coal; burning gas instead of oil, and especially coal for 
electricity, means lower greenhouse gas emissions. 
As we can observe, in the case of energy resources, it is clear that between transport and energy 
there are strong connections. It is important to have resources, but the possibility to control their 
delivery could become much more important. For this reason, the control over transport routes 
has a special connotation for each government. Each government wants to have independence in 
two domains: transportation and energy, and when you speak about pipelines you can easily note 
the magnificent combination which results. 
But in comparison with oil, which could be transported from different countries due to high 
mobility of maritime fleet, in the case of gas resources, this mobility is almost nil, the only 
exception being LNG (liquefied natural gas), but which could create a strong link between a 
seller and a buyer, due to high costs of terminals for conversion (in export port) and reconversion 
(in the post of destination). 
Taking these aspects into account, there it could be observed that Russia has a unique position. 
Due to logistic consideration, in the medium and long term, the oil will be traded globally, while 
gas will be traded regionally; coal due to its large spread, will be traded locally. The special place 
of Russia is due to its well endowment of oil and gas resources; Russia has almost 30% of the 
world’s proven gas reserves, and sits astride the transport network by which energy flows from 
the entire post-Soviet zone to the rest of the world.
10 In the same time, Russia has proven reserves 
of oil of 80 billion barrels, almost 7% in world total.
11 And it is possible in the future that Russia 
will size the control over great parts of untapped reserves in the Arctic, where are about 13-20% 
of world’s total resources;
12 this is because of the aggressive way in which it has claimed control 
over great part of them, aspect which could bring intense tensions with USA, and other riparian 
states. Already the Russian state-controlled oil company Gazprom has approximately 113000 
billion cubic feet of gas under development in the fields it owns in the Barents Sea;
13 and the 
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resources which could be found in the territory claimed by Moscow could contains as much as 
586 billion barrels of oil (bbl).
14 If this is real, then it is opportune to mention that Saudi Arabia 
has only 260 bbl. proven reserves. 
Only from Caspian Russian region Russian Federation produced in 2005 for example 1008,2 mil. 
tones oil equivalent.
15 
But why should we regard Russia as a power with great influence in Europe an in the world? The 
answer is connected to geo-economic field, and not necessary to the military one. Of course, this 
country has almost half of nuclear arms in the world, and this has given it great influence at 
world stage, but nowadays things have changed: if during Cold War Moscow menaced the world 
with its revolutionary zeal and its atomic weapons; today it looks at the world and sees its needs 
connected to development, and threat to hinder this process through energy flow’s obstruction. 
Let’s have a closer look at Russian politics regarding energy. 
The  nationalization  of  oil  and  gas  industry  was  one  of  the  pillars  of  this  process.  In  1996 
Vladimir Putin couldn’t even dream that four years later it would be the president of Russian 
Federation;  but  immediately  he  took  the  office,  he  engaged  to  create  national  champions  in 
Russia  –  these  national  champions  would  put  promotion  of  the  state’s  interest  over  profit 
maximization.
16 But even in June 1997 he, in a dissertation submitted to St. Petersburg Institute, 
and  in  an  article  “Mineral’no-syr’evye  resursy  v  strategi  razvitiia  Russiiskoi  ekonomiki” 
published in 1999 in Zapsiki Gornogo Instituta, presented a plan for Russia’s recovery and return 
to economic and political influence. The main theme was the calling on the Russian government 
to reassert control over the country’s natural resources and raw materials.
17 The effect of such a 
policy would be a low energy price in Russia, while outside it means suspending deliveries to 
countries which refuse to support Moscow’s foreign policy.
18 And in the case that a private 
company operating in Russia in oil or gas sectors doesn’t support the Russian line of policy, it 
would be denied for it the access to Russia’s oil and gas pipeline monopolies.
19 
In the same time, the “friendly persuasion” from Moscow hindered Yukos and Sibneft in their 
business and while preventing their acquisition by foreign companies (especially by American 
ones); furthermore, through the process, Moscow gained control of 41% of Ruusia’s oil output.
20 
Before the end of second term of Putin’s presidency, the most important industries in Russia – 
the strategic ones – went under state’s control through renationalization.
21 
But what is more important is the fact that these companies are controlled by siloviki; these men 
are economic nationalists and seek to restore Russia’s international greatness.
22 They are prone to 
promote the consolidation of political and economic power within an extremely centralized state, 
well-financed security and defense structures: they sustain a strong state – over the importance of 
social and economic freedoms – which had to have a strong voice in country’s economic life.
23 In 
order to attain their goal – taking account of Russia’s economic profile – these peoples pretend 
themselves  to  be  economic  nationalists,  arguing  that  country’s  natural  resources  belong  to 
Russian people, and that state must control them for that reason; the argument of bad years before 
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Putin’s ascension to power being brought as example. These justify the limited access of foreign 
companies to Russian resources, and a favorite treatment for Russian companies headed by those 
which are close to Kremlin. 
This administrative structure within Russia creates for this country a great bargaining power in 
economic  and  political,  and  even  in  security  areas,  because  through  Kremlin’s  control  over 
natural resources, and especially the control over pipelines, Moscow can influence decision in 
those countries which are dependent upon Russian resources and access to them. We point here 
to the fact that Central Asian states are dependent on Russian pipelines, which are controlled by 
Kremlin through the giant companies Gazprom and Rosneft, and they can have access to markets 
only  if  Kremlin  facilitates  it.  In  the  same  time,  Moscow  fights  to  limit  the  access  of  those 
countries to the market; the only failure until now is the BTC pipeline, which was built only due 
to the strong backing given from Washington. 
On the other hand, Moscow wants to have important shares in downstream parts of deliveries 
systems in EU. It fights hardly to gain access and to have control in delivery systems in the most 
important EU countries, making there strong allies in Germany and Italy. This policy is aimed to 
maintain and increase the European countries’ dependency on Russian energy flow, especial gas. 
For  example,  six  EU  member  countries  depend  totally  on  Russian  gas  (Bulgaria,  Slovakia, 
Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), while in other European countries Russian gas’ share is 
big enough to create for Moscow the capacity to have a strong voice in European politics. 
Moscow monopoly over gas pipelines has a powerful meaning: pipelines are the cheapest and 
most practical way for delivering gas, but this situation makes Europe extremely vulnerable, 
European countries being dependent on imported gas from Russia, a dependence that is set to 
increase.
24 And if Russia prevents the fulfilling of projects which would create alternative ways 
for gas deliveries from Central Asian states, than the Moscow’s clout in Europe would increase 
even bigger. It even took steps to prevent such possibilities: in summer of 2007 President Putin 
succeeded  in  promoting  future  collaboration  among  Turkmenistan,  Kazakhstan,  and  Russia, 
aiming to sell gas from those two countries in European countries, which would pass as before 
through Russian build pipelines. 
Another aspect which hints at Russian pipeline politics is that which regards the construction of a 
pipeline under the Baltic Sea – the so called Nord Stream – which would avoid the territory of 
some states which could create problems for Moscow. For the moment Germany buys 40% of its 
consumed gas from Russia,
25 while Italy 32%;
26 and through dealings with these two countries 
Moscow hopes to prevent the diversification of gas supply in Europe. The means are pipelines 
and the instrument in Moscow’s hand is Gazprom. This could be easy identified from Putin’s 
statement: “The gas pipeline system is the creation of the Soviet Union. We intend to retain state 
control over the gas transport system and over Gazprom. We will not split Gazprom up. And the 
European Commission should not have any illusions. In the gas sector, they will have to deal 
with the state.”
27 
Nord Stream would enhance Moscow’s influence over those countries through which passes gas 
from Russia to Western Europe; these are as follows: in the northern part of EU there are two 
pipeline systems: one which passes through Belarus and Poland to Germany, the other which 
passes through Ukraine, Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic and Germany. If there could be 
build a pipeline which would connect Russian directly to Germany, those countries mentioned 
above could be influenced by Moscow, creating a very different situation in comparison with that 
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encountered in 2006 and 2009, when Russia reduced the supply for Ukraine, while this country 
consumed the gas which was destined to Western European countries instead. This raised strong 
opposition from different countries in the region, including Sweden which threatened Russia with 
military actions if they would have started the project. 
Regarding  the  Southern  part  of  Europe,  there  Russia  intends  to  prevent  the  construction  of 
Nabucco  project,  which  would  increase  energy  security  through  Europe.  The  Moscow’s 
countermeasure could be given by South Stream project. Even the route for gas pipeline in the 
Western part of Bleak Sea is almost similar, the great difference lies in the fact that Nabucco is a 
European project, backed by EU, which would be constructed and operated by Europeans, which 
in the same time would bring out from isolationism and dependency on Moscow the Central 
Asian states, while South Stream would be an extension of the already finished Blue Stream 
pipeline, which carries gas from Russia to Turkey, and which would be filled, maintained, and 
operated by Russia, while its building would be realized by Gazprom and ENI from Italy. One 
spur would go via Greece into Southern Italy, while the other to the Northern Italy, through 
Romania, Hungary, and Slovenia.
28 
We can mention that after Angela Merkel became German Chancellor, the Nord Stream hasn’t 
got the same back up in Germany, but the Nabucco project, even if it got the President Sarkozy’s 
maintenance, as could be identified from President Sarkozy’s statement in Romanian Parliament 
in February 2008, couldn’t be realized until 2010. 
As a conclusion, Russia has maintained its influence over gas pipelines and deliveries in most 
countries in Europe, and this influence is expected to grow as in the European countries there will 
increase gas consumption in the future. This rising is due to the fact that the resources available 
in Europe will diminish, while the consumption of gas will increase due to both energy needs’ 
increase, and due to reducing of other natural resources used for energy production. The only 
way  to  reduce  the  control  which  Moscow  would  be  capable  to  exert  in  Europe  would  be 
connected to a more coherent energy policy crafted in Brussels having at its core EU countries’ 
interests, and a unified position from those countries in relation with Moscow. Both need each 
other, but in order to create a climate which will generate a better environment in EU countries it 
is needed a greater impendence from Moscow from energy point of view. Of course, Moscow 
can diversify its deliveries to East Asian countries which are hungry for energy resources, but a 
policy which will facilitate the gas deliveries from Central Asian states to EU via Nabucco, will 
generate great benefits for all those which will be part in it, from both ends of the pipeline. 
For Central Asian States it would mean the reduction of Moscow’s influence in their domestic 
and foreign politics, for Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey, through which Nabucco would pass, it 
would mean a closer relationship to Western countries, reducing Moscow’s influence in those 
countries  (especially  in  Georgia  and  Turkey,  due  to  reducing  their  dependency  of  Russian 
exported energy), while for EU countries it will be a proof of a coherent policy which could be 
crafted together by all those interested, reducing in the same time their dependence on Russian 
energy, and Kremlin’s will. 
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